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ELECTION LAW-DRAFT COMMITTEES: A LOOPHOLE IN THE
FEDERAL ELECTION LAws-Federal Election Commission v. Florida
For Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal Election Commission v. Floridafor Kennedy Committee 1
involved Federal Election Commission (FEC) investigation into the
activities of the Florida for Kennedy Committee (the Committee),2
one of nine "draft-Kennedy" organizations3 whose purpose was to
convince Senator Edward M. Kennedy to declare his candidacy for
the 1980 Democratic nomination for President. 4 The purpose of the
investigation was to determine if the Committee was operating
within the contribution guidelines of the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA).5 The Committee, however, disputed the FEC's juris
diction arguing that draft committees, such as the Committee, were
not political committees under the Act. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Committee's inter
pretation and held that draft committees were not political commit
tees within the meaning of the FECA and, as such, the activities of
the Committee fell outside the jurisdiction of the FEC. 6 Thus, the
1. 681 F.2d 1281 (lIth Cir. 1982).
2. The Florida for Kennedy Committee (the Committee) was established by a
group of Florida citizens who in mid-May of 1979 formed an association to demonstrate
and encourage support for Senator Kennedy in Florida. Their primary goal was to infiu
ence the outcome of a nonbinding straw poll to be held at the November Florida State
Democratic Convention for which they accepted contributions and made expenditures.
As a result of these activities, the Committee voluntarily registered as a political commit
tee with the FEC and submitted regular contribution and expenditure reports. Brief of
Appellant at 2-3, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d
1281 (11th Cir. 1982).
3. The FEC defines a draft committee as an "unauthorized committee disavowed
by the individual whose candidacy the committee promotes." 1979 FED. ELECTION
COMM'N ANN. REp. 7.
4. Although he officially announced his candidacy on October 29, 1979, Senator
Kennedy had expressly disavowed the activities of the Committee by a letter dated June
8, 1979. Brief of Appellant at 2-3, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982).
5. The Federal Election Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982».
6. F1oridafor Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d at 1282. The same result was reached by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Federal Elec
tion Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
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Committee and all other draft committees are not subject to any of
the requirements and restrictions, such as contribution limitations,
imposed on political committees by the FECA. This note will ad
dress how the court, in determining that draft committees are not
political committees under the Act, has provided a mechanism, by
which the purpose, intent and effectiveness of the campaign finance
laws, can be circumvented.

II.

FACTS

On July 17, 1979, the Committee requested an advisory opinion
from the FEC concerning the applicability of the Act's contribution
and expenditure limits to draft committees. 7 The FEC ruled that
because Senator Kennedy was not a candidate, the $5,000 individual
contribution limitation for "other political committees" applied. 8
Had the Committee been supporting an announced candidate, how
ever, such as Ronald Reagan or Jimmy Carter, the individual contri
bution limitation of $1,000 would have applied. 9
Of further concern to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Commit
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text. See
also Ifshin & Warin, Litigating the 1980 Presidential Election, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 485, 506
13 (1982).
7. 1979-40 FEC Advisory Opinion 1-3 (Aug 17, 1979), summarized in 1979 FED.
ELECTION COMM'N ANN. REp. 78-79. Specifically, the Committee asked three questions:
l. May [the Committee] receive monies in excess of $1,000 but not more than
$5,000 per calendar year, from an individual contributor, or other political
committee, to be expended for "raising issues relevant to the 1980 Presidential
Election and to cause Senator Kennedy to become a candidate for the Office of
President?"
2. Is there any limitation upon the amount of monies that [the Committee]
may expend to cause the selection of delegates to the November, 1979 State
party convention, who agree with the issues raised by [the Committee] and
would express their preference for Kennedy in the non-binding straw ballot at
the convention?
3. In the event the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what, if any,
effect would the making of said contributions have on the right of the individu
als to make contributions (a) to Senator Kennedy if he becomes a candidate; or
(b) to an authorized committee; or (c) directly or indirectly on behalf of such
candidate?
Id at 2. The FEC is required to issue an advisory opinion to any person who submits a
request for information concerning the Act's provisions. 2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(I) (1982).
8. 1979-40 FEC Advisory Opinion 1,2-3 (Aug. 17, 1979), summarized in 1979 FED.
ELECTION COMM'N ANN. REP. 78-79. The FEC also answered the second question in the
negative. Id at 3. The Commission refused to answer the third question because of its
hypothetical nature. Id
9. 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(l)(A) (1982). Thus, an individual could contribute a maxi
mum amount of $1,000 to a committee supporting a candidate such as Jimmy Carter, but
because a draft committee does not support an announced candidate, the limit is $5,000.
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tee was the fear that if the nine draft-Kennedy committees were
found to be independent of each other, a $5,000 contribution could
be made to each one without violating the FECA's contribution limi
tations. tO Faced with this situation, on October 4, 1979, Carter
Mondale filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that (I) the draft
Kennedy groups were political committees under the Act; II (2) the
nine draft-Kennedy committees l2 were affiliated l3 and therefore sub
ject to an aggregate $5,000 contribution limitation; 14 and (3) the Ma
chinists Non-Partisan Political League,IS the political arm of the
International Association of Machinists, had exceeded the $5,000
limitation by contributing over $33,000 to the allegedly affiliated
political committees. 16 In response to this complaint, the FEC noti
fied the Committee "that it had 'reason to believe'17 that violations
Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6, at 508 n.162 (citing FEC Informational Letter 1976-20
(Aug. 17, 1976».
10. If, however, the committees were found to be affiliated they would be treated as
a single committee and subject to the contribution limitations for single political commit
tees. 2 U.S.c. § 441a(a)(5) (1982).
11. Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655
F.2d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
12. Eight other political committees also were involved in the FEC subpoena: Cit
izens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980; New Hampshire Democrats for Change;
Democrats for Change in 1980; National Call for Kennedy; Illinois Citizens for Ken
nedy; Committee for Alternatives to Democratic Presidential Candidate; Minnesota for a
Democratic Alternative; and D.C. Committee for a Democratic Alternative. Brief for
Appellee at 2 n.3, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d
1281 (11th Cir. 1982).
13. Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655
F.2d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). See supra note 10.
14. Federal Election Co"mm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655
F.2d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
15. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League (MNPL) represents what the
Act terms a "separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corpora
tion, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or cooperation without
capital stock." 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)2(C) (1982). For purposes of making contributions
MNPL is classified as a multicandidate political committee: "a political committee
which has been registered under section 433 of [Title 2) for a period of not less than 6
months, which has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except for any
state political party organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for
Federal office. Id § 44la(a)(4).
16. The Act provides that: "No multicandidate political committee shall make
contributions-{c) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the
aggregate, exceed $5,000." 2 U.S.c. § 44la(a)(2)(C) (1982). The $33,000 given by
MNPL to the allegedly affiliated draft committees violated the $5,000 contribution limit
because contributions to affiliated political committees are subject to the limits of a single
political committee. See supra note 10. Similarly, the Committee would have violated
the Act by knowingly accepting the excess MNPL contributions. 2 U.S.C. § 44 I a(f)
(1982).
17. The FEC cannot initiate an investigation on a complaint until it has made an
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of the federal campaign laws had occurred."18
Upon receipt of the FEC's notification, the Committee moved
on November I, 1979 to dismiss the Carter-Mondale complaint ar
guing that the "[Committee] was a draft committee and not a polit
ical committee within the meaning of the Act"19 and, as such, none
of the Act's reporting or contribution requirements were applicable
to it.20 Before considering the Committee motion, the FEC, on No
vember 5th, served the Committee with the subpoena which was the
basis of the Committee's appeal.2 1 The FEC subsequently denied
both the Committee motion that draft committees were not subject
to the Act's restriction and a later Committee motion to quash the
subpoena. 22 Upon the Committee's refusal to comply with the sub
poena, the FEe instituted the present action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 23 The Commit
tee countered by seeking a plenary hearing24 to challenge the scope
of the FEC's jurisdiction over draft groups.25 The District Court,
however, "ruled that the subpoena enforcement proceeding was not
the proper forum in which to challenge the FEC's jurisdiction or to
initial "reason to believe" determination that a violation of the Act has occurred. 2
U.S.c. § 437g(a)(2) (1982). An affirmative vote by four of the FEC's six voting members
will satisfy the "reason to believe" test and the alleged violator must then be notified that
such a determination has been made. fd. The FEC is then under a duty to conduct an
investigation. fd.
18. 681 F.2d at 1282. The Carter-Mondale committee complaint was subsequently
amended on November 2, 1979. It provided additional information for the affi.liation
claim and further alleged that Senator Kennedy had, in fact, become a candidate on
September I, 1979, two months before his official announcement. Federal Election
Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 383-84 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cerro denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
19. 681 F.2d at 1282.
20.
21.

fd.
fd. at 1282-83. The subpoena requested the Committee and its organizers to

tum over all documents and materials concerning its involvement with the MNPL and
other draft-Kennedy groups. fd. at 1283 n.3.
22. fd. at 1282-83.
23. Federal Election Comm'n V. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 492 F.Supp. 587
(S.D. Fla. 1980). See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6)(A) (1982) (enforcement provision for viola
tions of the Act).
24. Relying on the first amendment's protection of free speech and association, the
Committee claimed that (I) the subpoena was unconstitutional, and (2) the presence of
the constitutional questions involved required the FEC to fully demonstrate its jurisdic
tion over draft groups before the subpoena could be enforced. 492 F.Supp. at 591. Al
though the district court determined that some unintended infringement of first
amendment rights might occur from enforcement of the subpoena, it reasoned that the
FEC's need for speedy investigations outweighed any potential infringement of the Com
mittee's constitutional rights in this instance. fd. at 596-98.
25. fd. at 591. The FEC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over the enforcement of
the Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(I) (1982).
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raise constitutional objections to the subpoena."26 The court subse
quently enforced the subpoena on November 6, 1980, and the Com
mittee's appeal was filed. 27
III.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FECA AND STATUTORY
REGULATION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES

Initial Attempts at Regulating Campaign Financing and Political
Committees

During the early 1900's, Congress28 and the public became in
creasingly concerned about the presence of corruption in the electo
ral process, particularly the connection between the alleged
corruption and corporate wealth. 29 This concern led to the adoption
26. 681 F.2d at 1283.
27. Id Favorable rulings enforcing FEC subpoenas in this investigation were also
registered by the district courts in the other draft-Kennedy group cases. E.g., Federal
Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 210 App. D.C. 267
(D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981);
Federal Election Comm'n v. Citizens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980,210 App. D.e.
284 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 397 (D.e. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981);
Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, No. 80-C-124
(W.D. Wis. Apr. 24, 1980) (this group did not appeal the decision and chose instead to
comply with the FEC subpoena). The other draft-Kennedy groups complied with the
subpoena in the first instance. 1981 FED. ELECTIONS COMM'N ANN. REP. 24.
Whether the Committee could properly contest the subpoena issue in an enforce
ment proceeding was the first issue to be determined by the eleventh circuit. Federal
Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1283 (I Ith Cir. 1982).
The court noted that the FEC subpoena had "several characteristics that make it neces
sary for the court to be certain of the FEC's investigative authority before enforcing it
. . . ." Id at 1284. See also Federal Election Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan
Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 386-90 (D.e. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
The FEC alleged that the "extra careful scrutiny" test attached to FEC subpoenas will
seriously hamper the operation of the FEe. Petition for writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at 14-15, Federal Election
Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
28. In hearings before the House Committee on the Election of the President in
1905, one legislator described the purpose behind the early attempts at legislative regula
tion of campaign finances:
The idea is to prevent . . . the great railroad companies, the great insur
ance companies, the great telephone companies, the great aggregations of
wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members
of the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests against those of the public.
THE PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 54 (1976) (em
phasis in original).
29. One of the more suspect methods of campaign fund raising concerned the ef
forts of Mark Hannah, the chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1896.
Hannah set contribution quotas for banks, life insurance companies and other business
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of the Tillman Act of 1907,30 which prohibited all direct corporate
and national bank contributions to political committees and cam
paigns regarding election to federal office. A second step, designed
to curtail the corruption in federal elections, was the passage of the
Federal Disclosure Act of 1910. 31 This statute required all interstate
political committees to report campaign contributions and
expenditures. 32
Both the Tillman Act and the Federal Disclosure Act were in
corporated into the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,33 which
represented the primary federal law on the subject of campaign
finance. The Hatch Political Activities Act of 193934 was the first
addition to the Corrupt Practices Act. The Hatch Act was enacted
primarily to prohibit active political participation by federal employ
ees, though several of its 1940 Amendments dealt with the issue of
political committees. Specifically, the 1940 Amendments placed a
$5,000 limit upon individual contributions to anyone political com
mittee or on behalf of anyone candidate. 35 Expenditures by polit
ical committees were limited to 3 million dollars.36
A final piece of legislation, the War Labor Disputes Act of
1943,37 extended the contribution prohibition from banks and corpo
organizations based on their ability to pay. For instance, the quota for banks was one
fourth of one per cent of their capital. The net result was a campaign chest of about $3.5
million for the Republic nominee William McKinley ($3 million coming from the New
York City area) as opposed to only $675,000 for his counterpart William Jennings Bryan,
This disparity was a major factor in McKinley's victory. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING
POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 47 (2d ed. 1980).
30. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 44lb (1982». In part, the Act provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organ
ized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in
connection with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for
any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any
election at which Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative
in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a
United States Senator . . . .
Id. at ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864-65.
31. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (repealed 1925).
32. Id. at 36 Stat. 823-24.
33. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch.368, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified
in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C. (1970» (repealed 1972).
34. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (extended in Act of July 19, 1940, ch.
640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1982».
35. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 13, 54 Stat. 767, 770-71.
36. Id. at § 20, 54 Stat. 772.
37. Act of June 25,1943, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943) (current version at
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(l) (1982».
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rations to labor unions. 38 All of the combined provisions discussed
represent the basic structure of federal campaign regulations prior to
the enactment of the FECA in 1971.39
This basic structure, however, was totally ineffective in achiev
ing comprehensive regulation of federal elections. One glaring loop
hole in the scheme involved the definition of a political committee.40
A political committee was defined as an entity that operated in more
than one state or that operated as a branch or subsidiary of a na
tional party.41 An individual could easily circumvent the Act's con
tribution limitations by giving a maximum gift of $5,000 to an
interstate political committee and then contribute additional funds,
in an unlimited amount, to an intrastate committee. By virtue of its
operation in only one state, an intrastate committee did not qualify
as a political committee under the Act.42 Because most congres
sional campaigns involved primarily intrastate committees, the statu
tory restrictions had little effect on congressional elections. 43 The
provision limiting political committees to three million dollars in ex
penditures was similarly ineffective. Once a political committee
reached the limit, additional committees were formed until all avail
able funds were utilized. Additionally, there were no expenditure
limitations for primaries or conventions.44
Many of the other provisions regulating political activity, partic
ularly those restricting business and labor, were also easily bypassed
orconstantly abused. 45 For instance, the disclosure provisions were
38. Recodified in the National Labor Relations Act.of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.c. §§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp. V 1981», the prohibition was
expanded to apply to direct expenditures for primary elections, political conventions and
caucuses. Id at § 304, 61 Stat. 159-60.
39. For a detailed discussion of the legislation preceding the FECA, see generally,
R. PEABODY, 1. BERRY, W. FRASURE & 1. GOLDMAN, To ENACT A LAW: CONGRESS AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCING. (I 972); Berry & Goldman, Congress and Public Policy: A Study of
the Federal Campaign Act of 1971, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331 (1973).
40. Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 365 (1977);
Note, Campaign Spending Controls Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 8
COLUM. 1.L. & Soc. PROBS. 285, 288 (1972).
41. 18 U.S.c. § 591 (1970)(repealed 1972). See infra note 56 and accompanying
text for the amended definition of a political committee.
42. Note, supra note 40 at 288 n.32.
43. Id at 288.
44. Id For example, in order to avoid the contribution and expenditure limita
tions, the 1968 Democratic Presidential team of Humphrey-Muskie created more than 95
different committees. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 45 (1975).
45. For a detailed discussion of the methods used by labor and business to circum
vent the contribution and expenditure restrictions, see Epstein, Corporations and Labor
Unions in Electoral Politics, 425 ANNALS 33 (May, 1976). The author concludes that
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similarly ineffective because candidates were only required to report
contributions received and expenditures made "by him or any per
son for him with his knowledge or consent."46 Candidates inter
preted "any person" as not including their local or interstate
committees and this interpretation was accepted by the Department
of Justice. This acceptance was so widespread that several candi
dates such as Senators Kennedy, Muskie, Bensten and Brock re
ported having received no campaign contributions in 1970.47
A final problem contributing to the ineffectiveness of the entire
legislative scheme was the lack of enforcement. Since 1925, enforce
ment of the Corrupt Practices Act resulted in only one prosecution48
and no convictions.49
Aside from the numerous loopholes and overall ineffectiveness
of the pre-1971 legislation, several other factors existed that
prompted Congress to institute new regulations governing campaign
financing. One factor was evidenced by the dramatic increase in
campaign related expenditures. 50 With the public becoming increas
ingly alarmed over increased campaign expenditures, it became diffi
cult for candidates to publicly go on record as opposing efforts to
improve the system. 51 Finally, an issue group entitled the National
Committee for an Effective Congress outlined several of the initial
proposals and helped insure the ultimate enactment of new legisla
tion. 52 From virtually every perspective the pre-I971 campaign laws
were a nullity and "[b]oth candidates and the public [had] come to
regard the law as a dead letter."53
"[vJirtually no corporation or labor union that wished to do so was deterred de facto
from making campaign contributions and expenditures." Id at 38. See also Pipefitters
Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (discussing the history of the
law on union contributions and expenditures and ultimately upholding the constitution
ality of the educational expenditures made by the political action arm of unions and
corporations as long as any contribution collected is voluntary in nature and these mon
ies are separated from the organization's general treasury funds).
46. Note, supra note 40 at 290 (quoting 2 U.S.c. § 246(a) (1970) (repealed 1972».
47. Id at 290-91, 290 n.47.
48. Id at 291. See Burroughs & Canon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934)
(rejecting the violators claim that the disclosure provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional).
49. Berry & Goldman, supra note 39, at 333.
50. Note, supra note 40, at 285 n.4.
51. Expenditures increased from $200 million in 1964 to $300 million in the 1968
campaign. Id This increase differed substantially from the $25 million increase in 1968
over the cost of the 1964 elections. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 9.
52. Berry & Goldman, supra note 39 at 334-35.
53. Note, supra note 40 at 291.
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B. Implementation ofthe FECA and its Impact on Political
Committees

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
The FECA of 1971 54 is comprised of four Titles,55 with Title III
the most important for purposes of this Note. In an effort to close
the loopholes, Title III redefined a political committee as "any com
mittee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives
contributions or makes expenditures during a calender year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 . . . ."56 In addition, both can
didates and political committees were required to periodically file
statements identifying all campaign contributions received over
$100. 57 The 1971 Act, however, did not establish contribution limi
tations or an overall expenditure ceiling.
1.

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974
The 1974 Amendments58 dramatically altered the FECA of
1971. There were two primary reasons for the substantial revision of
the original Act. The first reason concerned the numerous abuses of
campaign financing demonstrated in the Watergate affair. 59 Sec
2.

54. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.c. §§ 431
455 (1982».
55. Title I restricted the amount of money which could be used for media advertis
ing. 47 U.S.C § 315 (1972) (this portion of the Act was later repealed by the 1974 amend
ments). Title II limited the amount a candidate could contribute to his own campaign
out of his or her family's personal funds, 18 U.S.c. § 608(a)(I) (1972) (repealed 1976),
and contained a provision expressly allowing corporations and labor unions to establish
separate segregated funds for political purposes. 18 U.S.c. § 610 (repealed 1976) (cur
rent version at 2 U.S.C. § 44lb (1982». These expenditures were already being made
under the guise of educational expenditures by the political action arms of unions and
corporations. See supra note 45. Title IV repealed the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925
Pub. L. No. 506, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C. (1970»
(repealed 1972).
56. This definition of a political committee remained the same in the Federal Elec
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 and 1976,2 U.S.C. § 43 I (d)(I 976), and thus, is
the one utilized by the Floridafor Kennedy Comm. court. 681 F.2d at 1286. The defini
tion was modified slightly under the 1979 Amendments. 2 U.S.c. § 431(4) (1982).
57. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (1976). This amount was increased to $200 by the 1979
amendments. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A), (5)(A) (1982).
58. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
59. While the disclosure provisions of the Act did contribute to the discovery of the
Watergate abuses, the mere presence of the extensive misconduct surrounding Nixon's
1972 re-election campaign clearly showed that the present requirements were inadequate.
D. AOAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 44 at 5. The drive for reform was also spurred on
by the public's reaction to Watergate. In 1965, a survey by the Research Center of the
University of Michigan showed 71% of the respondents against the public financing of
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ondly, a three judge district court inAmerican Civil Liberties Union v.
Jennings60 declared several of the Act's provisions unconstitu
tiona1. 61 Congress' reconsideration of the FECA resulted in the con
stitutional issue being mooted before the case reached the Supreme
Court. 62
In response to the "orgy of big giving"63 which took place in the
1972 Presidential campaign, Congress reinstated contribution limits
in the 1974 Amendments. Individuals were limited to an annual
contribution of $1,000 per candidate per election64 and $5,000 to
political committees not affiliated with the candidate. 65 Further
more, an absolute limit of $25,000 was established as the aggregate
amount that an individual could contribute to all candidates and
political committees. 66
The Act also limited to $5,000 the amount that political commit
tees could contribute to candidates or their campaigns. 67 Political
federal elections. By contrast, Gallup polls taken in 1973 and 1974 displayed support for
public financing by 65% and 67% margins respectively. Id. at 61 n.3. For a discussion of
the many abuses of the 1972 campaign as a basis for upholding the FECA's major provi
sions, see, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 nn. 36-38 (1975), rev'd in part, 424 U.S.
I (1976).
60. 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three judge court), vacated as moot subnom.
Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
61. Id. Because of the sponsorship requirements of the Act, the New York Times
had rejected an advertisement proposed by the American Civil Liberties Union and
other organizations expressing opposition to the Nixon Administration's proposed legis
lation to limit court-ordered busing. The advertisement included an "Honor Roll" of
102 congressmen and congresswomen who had previously opposed the antibusing policy.
366 F. Supp. at 1043-44. The court first held that Title I § 104(b) of the FECA and its
accompanying regulations, that required the media to determine whether a proposed ad
vertisement had satisfied the Act's certification and identification requirements, estab
lished impermissible prior restraints on open discussion of matters of public concern. Id.
at 1050-51. Such restrictions are violative of the first amendment and, thus, unconstitu
tional. Id. at 1054.
The Jennings court found that the disclosure provisions of Title III of the Act were
unconstitutional when applied to American Civil Liberties Union in the instant case. Id.
at 1057. This aspect of the Jennings case will be discussed later in the note. See infra
note 79 and accompanying text.
62. Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030, 1030-1031 (1975).
63. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 44, at 54.
64. 2 U.S.c. § 44la(I)(A) (1982). Primaries, runoffs and general elections are con
sidered separate elections except that the pre-nomination period in presidential cam
paigns constitutes a single election. Id. § 43 I (l)(A), (D).
65. Id. § 44la(I)(C).
66. Id. § 44la(a)(3).
67. Id. § 44la(a)(2)(A). The contribution limit .is $5,000 rather than the $1,000
limitation for individuals as long as the committee meets certain requirements. See supra
note IS. See generally Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6, at 492-95. Other changes in the
1974 amendments included limitations on expenditures. Individuals were limited on the
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committees, however, were not limited regarding the total or aggre
gate amount that they could contribute to all candidates or commit
tees in a given election.
3. Buckley v. Valeo
On almost the very day that the 1974 version of the Act went
into effect, a major constitutional challenge68 was made in Buckley v.
Valeo .69 The Court first determined that the regulation of monies
used to generate political activity represented a regulation of speech
and not conduct. 70 Thus, the provisions of the Act limiting contribu
tions and expenditures restrained the fundamentally protected areas
of political expression and association. The Court required the dem
onstration of a compelling governmental interest in order to with
stand the necessary strict scrutiny involved in such first amendment
issues. 71
The Court ultimately held that only the prevention of corrup
tion, and the appearance of corruption, were significantly compelling
to justify the contribution limitations.72 Even this governmental inamount they could independently spend in support of a candidate. Candidates were
limited in. the amount which they or their authorized political committees could spend in
their election effort. Id Limitations on expenditures by candidates refusing public sub
sidies were declared unconstitutional restrictions on first amendment rights. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59 (1976). See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. The 1974
revision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971 provided public fund
ing for Presidential Candidates. Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 801, 85 Stat. 563 (codified at
I.R.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9013 (West 1982). Also, in an effort to insure compliance with the
FECA, the 1974 amendments created the Federal Election Commission (FEC). 2 U.S.c.
§ 437(c} (1982). Until the creation of the FEC, the Justice Department was primarily
responsible for enforcing the election laws. Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6 at 494 n.57.
Finally, the 1974 amendments added to the disclqsure requirements of the 1971 Act with
most of these changes designed to improve the reporting aspects of the Act. See gener
ally, D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 44, at 92-3. The amendment required candi
dates to designate a principle campaign committee which is responsible for reporting all
financial transactions made on the candidate's behalf, including those of his political
committees. 2 U.S.C. § 432(f) (1982).
68. See generally, Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its Pros
pects: The Constitutionality of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29
VAND. L. REV. 1327 (1976).
69. 424 U.S. I (1976).
70. 424 U.S. at 17. The Buckley court's distinction was elaborated on by the Dis
trict Court for the District of Columbia in Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489
(1980) (three judge court) affd per curiam hyan equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129
(1982).
71. 424 U.S. at 25.
72. Id at 29. Limiting contributions serves to eliminate the subsequent "favors" or
quid pro quos often involved when a large contributor donates a substantial sum to a
potential office holder. Because the potential favors to large contributors and the public
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terest, however, was not sufficient to permit a limitation on expendi
tures. 73 In addition, the court noted that the Act's expenditure
limitations represented substantial restraints on the "quantity and
diversity of political speech"74 as opposed to the contribution limita
tions which entailed "only a marginal restriction upon the contribu
tor's ability to engage in free communication."75 Thus, political
committees are permitted to spend an unlimited amount in support
of a particular candidate provided its expenditures are made inde
pendently of the candidate's campaign.76
With these initial determinations as a background, the Buckley
court then discussed the definition of political committees under the
Act. 77 The specific context in which the Court defined political com
perception of these practices tend to undermine the integrity of a representative democ
racy, the prevention of this type of corruption represents a compelling governmental in
terest substantial enough to overshadow first amendment restrictions. Id at 26-29.
73. Id at 45. The court concluded that expenditures made without the candidate's
cooperation and consent "may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign
and indeed may prove counterproductive" to his efforts. Id at 47. Thus, large independ
ent expenditures do not present the same type of quidpro quo corruption identified with
large contributors. Id at 46. But see, Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77
COLUM. L.R. 345,367-75 (1977) (expenditure limitations can be justified on self-govern
ment, equality, and promotion of discussion grounds); Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 WIS. L.
REv. 323, 340-44 (author proposes that the court's conclusion that independent expendi
ture limitations posed no danger of corruption was incorrectly reasoned) ..
74. 424 U.S. at 19.
75. Id at 20-21. The Court's constitutional distinction can best be explained by
classifying the two types of political participants as spenders and contributors. The for
mer expresses himself directly and the latter, through his contributions, enables others to
express his viewpoint. Expenditure limitations directly restrain the first amendment
rights of spenders, substantially preventing them from speaking. In contrast, contribu
tion limitations only marginally restrict the contributor from speaking, he can still ex
press his views directly through expenditures. See Fleming, Regulation of Campaign
Financing 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. LAW 649, 656.
76. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
90 Stat. 475, 479 (1976), defined what constitutes an independent expenditure as opposed
to a contribution. Any expenditure made in "cooperation, consultation or concert with,
or at the request or suggestion of a candidate, his authorized political committee or their
agents" must be classified as a contribution. 2 U.S.c. § 44la(a)(7)(B)(i) (1982). The
FEC regulations go a step further and define payments made as a result of information
received from the candidate about his contribution plans or needs. II C.F.R.
§ 109.l(b)(4)(i)(A)(1982). See also infra note 117. For a more complete discussion of the
1976 amendments see infra note 87.
77. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 62-63 (1976). In addition to upholding the Act's
contribution . limitations and declaring the expenditure limitations unconstitutional, the
Court upheld the Act's disclosure and reporting provisions. Id at 64. Although these
provisions do infringe on the privacy of associational rights guaranteed by the first
amendment, the Court found three governmental interests compelling enough to over
come the strict scrutiny test:
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mittees concerned a portion of the Act which required disclosure of
contributions and expenditures. 78 While the Court noted that re
quiring disclosure of contributions was sufficiently related to the
Act's goals of preventing corruption the provisions requiring disclo
sure of expenditures, if interpreted broadly, would require disclosure
by those groups advocating specific issues as well as those supporting
individual candidates. 79 To avoid potential constitutional problems
(I) they tell the public where the money is coming from, (2) they deter actual

corruption and lessen the appearance of corruption by exposing large contribu
tions and expenditures, and (3) they provide an essential means of determining
violations of the statutes provisions. Id at 66-68. The Court, however, did note
that there may be instances where the reporting and disclosure requirements
may have such a chilling effect on a certain group that the organization would
be exempt from these requirements.
Id at 82 n.109. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee v. Fed
eral Election Comm'n, 51 U.S.L.W. 4015 (1982) (Socialist Workers Party not required to
disclose identity of contributors for to do so may subject them to threats, harassment and
reprisals). Federal Election Comm'n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d
416 (2nd Cir. 1982) (Communist Party not obligated to comply with FECA's disclosure
and reporting requirements).
The public funding of Presidential campaigns was also upheld by the Buckley Court
which noted that while acceptance of public funding required adherence to expenditure
limitations, candidates are not required to accept public funding and, therefore, those
who accept it must also accept any attached statutory restrictions. 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
The Buckley Court did, however, hold that the selection of the FEC commissioners
did not adhere to the Constitutional requirements of the appointments clause. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, c1.2. Thus, the commission, as presently constituted, could not exer
cise the duties granted it. 424 U.S. at 143-44.
78. 424 U.S. at 78-81.
79. In determining that political committees must be narrowly interpreted so as to
exclude issue groups, the Buckley Court relied on the holdings of two earlier lower court
decisions. 424 U.S. at 79 n.l06 (citing United States v. National Committee for Impeach
ment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2nd Cir. 1972), and American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings,
366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three judge court), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975».
National Commilleefor Impeachment involved an advertisement in the New York
Times entitled, "A Resolution to Impeach Richard M. Nixon as President of the United
States." 469 F.2d at 1143. The advertisement was paid for by the National Committee
for Impeachment and listed the officers and sponsors of the committee, as well as an
"Honor Roll" comprised of congressmen and congresswomen who supported the resolu
tion. The advertisement also included a request for contributions and specifically noted
that money obtained would be used to support the election of congressmen and congress
women who favored Nixon's impeachment. 469 F.2d at 1138. The Justice Department
claimed that the advertisement was made and purchased for "the purpose of intluencing"
the outcome of the 1972 presidential election and took action under the FECA of 1971 to
require that the National Committee for Impeachment follow the disclosure provisions
of the Act. Id The Second Circuit held that if such groups were considered political
committees under the Act, then "serious constitutional issues" would be presented. Id at
140. The court reasoned that if the government's position was adopted and the Act inter
preted broadly, then every organization advocating an issue, from the Boy Scouts to the
Golden Agers, would be required to register with the government as a political eommit
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of requiring every type of group to disclose every type of expendi
ture, the Court found that disclosure of expenditures by groups other
than political committees or candidates must be narrowed to include
only those expenditures for communications that expressly advocate
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 80 This intertee, and be subjected to the many filing and disclosure provisions of the Act. Thus, in an
effort to narrow the definition of a political committee, the court interpreted the statute as
requiring two tests to define the phrase "made for the purpose of influencing." Id at
1141. The first test defined the phrase as including any "expenditure made with the
authorization or consent, expressed or implied, or under the control; direct or indirect, of
a candidate or his agents." Under the second test, the Act applied "only to committees
soliciting contributions or expenditures the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election or candidates." The second circuit concluded that the National Committee for
Impeachment did not qualify as a political committee under either test because there
existed no "connection whatsoever between the National Committee and any candidate,"
and "the major purpose of the advertisement was to promote the impeachment move
ment and to condemn governmental policy on the Vietnam War, not to elect candidates."
Id at 1141. While the National Committee for Impeachment failed to satisfy either test,
the Second Circuit did not comment on whether satisfaction of only one test would qual
ify the group as a political committee under the Act. Id See generally, Elections-Fed
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971-A political committee is not required to disclose
receipts, expenditures and names ofcontributors under the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, unless the major purpose of such a committee is the nomination or election of
candidates and committee expenditures are authorized or controlled by a specific candidate,
42 U. CIN. L. REV. 383 (1973) (an analysis of United States v. National Comm. for
Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the author concludes that any
group whose major purpose is to influence an election, not the nomination or election of
a specific candidate, should be subject to the Act's provisions).
The National Committee for Impeachment interpretation was approved in American
Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings where an advertisement sponsored by the ACLU ex
pressing opposition to- court-ordered busing was rejected by the New York Times be
cause it did not contain the necessary identification required under the Act. 366 F. Supp.
1041, 1050-51 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The en
forcement of the Act's disclosure provisions in the present instance, the court reasoned,
would involve a chilling effect on the ACLU's rights. The court, therefore, adopted the
narrow National Committee for Impeachment test and concluded that the activities did
not satisfy either test. If the Act were to include the plaintiffs as a political committee,
the resulting first amendment violations would necessitate an invalidation of the Act's
disclosure provisions. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. at 1054-57. Thus, to sustain the disclosure
provisions of Title III, political committees must be defined only in terms of the National
Committee for Impeachment test.
Both the National Committee for Impeachment and Jennings decisions are consistent
with Buckley because both of the committees involved in those decisions were issue
groups in which the potential for quidpro quo corruption was insufficient to justify the
infringement on their first amendment rights. Draft committees, however, represent a
different type of committee requiring a treatment distinguishable from that of the com
mittees in National Committeefor Impeachment and Jennings. Classification of the Flor
ida for Kennedy Committee and other draft committees as political committees may be
accomplished, however, without violating the holdings or rationales of the two lower
court cases and Buckley. See infra notes 112-37 and accompanying text.
80. 424 U.S. at 80.
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pretation would avoid first amendment problems of vagueness be
cause only expenditures that expressly advocated a particular
election result would necessitate disclosure. 81
In its discussion, the Court stipulated its interpretation of what
constituted a political committee for purposes of the Act. As empha
sized, the Court was concerned that the Act's contribution and ex
penditure definitions were so vague as to include "issue groups."82
They noted:
The general requirement that "political committees" and can
didates disclose their expenditures could raise similar vagueness
problems, for "political committee" is defined only in terms of
amount of annual "contributions" and "expenditures," and could
be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion.
The lower courts have construed the words "political committee"
more narrowly. To fulfill the purposes of the Act they need only
encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate
or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a
candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of "political commit
tees" so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area
sought to be addressed by Congress. 83

The Court's concern with the inclusion of issue groups is based on
the fact that infringement upon a group's first amendment rights of
political expression and association84 can only be justified if the
means employed involve the compelling governmental interest of
preventing quidpro quo corruption or the appearance of such cor
ruption. 85 Thus, the Buckley Court used the word "candidate" to
81. ld. at 76-82.
82. Ultimately, the Court struck down the expenditure limitations although they
did uphold the Act's contribution limitations and disclosure provisions. See mpra notes
71-77 and accompanying text.
83. 424 U.S. at 79 (footnotes omitted).
84. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. But see mpra notes 72-77 and ac
companying text (infringement upon first amendment associational rights justifiable if a
sufficiently compelling governmental interest exists). Federal Election Comm'n v. Na
tional Right to Work Committee, 5 I U.S.L.W. 4037 (1982) (associational rights asserted
are overridden by Congress' interests in enacting legislation which restricts some opera
tions of segregated funds, solicitations of contributions by corporations in this instance,
which must be limited to avoid actual or apparent corruption).
85. 424 U.S. at 81. The Buckley Court also noted that not only had the contribu
tion limitations been justified because of the potential quidpro quo corruption involved,
but also contribution limitations are, in general, less restrictive of political activity than
expenditure limitations. ld. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. See also, Citi
zens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (contribution limitations are less restrictive of the first amendment right to
political expression than are limitations on expenditures).
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protect the first amendment rights of issue groups whose expendi
tures contained little potential for the type ofquidpro quo corruption
that the court believed was significant to justify infringement of the
rights to free political expression and association.
Therefore, the Buckley Court determined that there were two
types of political groups. On the one hand, there are those commit
tees that advocate and support particular issues. Under the Buckley
rationale, these groups are not considered political committees
within the meaning of the FECA. At the other extreme are those
committees whose purpose is the election of an announced candi
date. Such committees are clearly included under the express provi
sion of the Act86 and their inclusion is justified by the compelling
governmental interest of eliminating quidpro quo corruption. 87
4.

Citizens Against Rent Control v. City

of Berkley

The Buckley rationale for the different treatment regarding is
sue and candidate group was echoed in another recent Supreme
Court case involving election law: Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkley.88 Citizens involved a city ordinance limiting the
86. 424 u.s. at 81. Prior to the 1979 amendments, the FECA required "each treas
urer of a political committee supporting a candidate or candidates for election to federal
office," to report to the FEC. 2 U.S.c. § 434(a)(I) (1976) (amended version at 2 U.S.c.
§ 434(a)(I) (1982».
87. The decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), forced Congress to repeal
the Act's unconstitutional provisions and to reappoint the FEC commissioners in accord
ance with constitutional requirements. See supra note 77. In addition to these adjust
ments, Congress also defined the role of and limitations on separate segregated funds
established by corporations and labor unions now commonly referred to as political ac
tion committees or Pacs. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I)(C) (1982), see also supra note 45. The
1976 revisions explicitly established a $5,000 per election limit on contributions to indi
vidual Pacs and all Pacs administered by the same union or corporation were considered
affiliated and treated as a single political committee. Corporations were allowed to solicit
contributions only from stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and not
all employees as was previously the case. Id. § 441(b). See International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Federal Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (en banc) affd mem., 103 S.Ct. 335 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Act's provisions regulating the solicitation of funds by corporations and unions).
Originally, Pacs represented only those political committees associated with labor
unions or corporations. Today, however, the term Pac applies to almost every committee
engaged in soliciting funds for political purposes. Ever since labor and corporate Pacs
were authorized by Congress, they have become an increasingly important means of in
fluence in political elections. They represent an effective means of utilizing campaign
funds because they are well organized and administratively efficient. Ironically, it was
the impact of labor and corporate wealth which Congress first tried to eliminate when it
began regulating campaign financing. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
88. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). For other cases examining the first amendment conse
quences of contribution limitations in referendum campaigns, see First National Bank of
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amount that an individual could contribute to a committee in sup
port of, or in opposition to, ballot measures. 89 The Court held that
the ordinance violated the plaintiffs first amendment rights of polit
ical expression and association. 90 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court noted that the corruption by potential large donors repre
sented the only justification for allowing an infringement upon first
amendment rights. 91 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the major
ity, stated that "Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the
rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the first amend
ment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of
large contributions to a candidate ."92
Citizens is important for the purposes of this note because it ex
emplifies the types of groups that the Buckley court was attempting
to protect by narrowly defining a political committee. 93 The activi
ties of such groups exist only to advocate certain specific issues or
ballot questions. They do not exist for the purpose of electing a spe
cific individual. As the concurring opinion noted:
In Buckley, this Court upheld limitations on contributions to

candidates as necessary to prevent contributors from corrupting
the representatives to whom the people have delegated political
decisions. But curtailment of speech and association in a ballot
measure campaign, where the people themselves render the ulti
mate political decision, cannot be justified on this basis. 94

Infringement upon speech and associational rights simply can not be
justified "in a ballot measure campaign, where the people themselves
render the ultimate political decision" and the potential for corrup
tion is not present. 95 Further, the Citizens court explained that any
corruption could be prevented, or at least discovered, by the city's
disclosure ordinances. 96 Under the Florida for Kennedy Committee
opinion, not even this protective device would be available to reguBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1976), and Let's Help Florida v. McCary, 621 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1980).
89. Id at 293. The amount was limited to $250 per contributor, yet the group
collected $20,850 from only nine contributors, or $18,600 more than if none of the contri
butions had exceeded $250.
90. Id at 299.
91. Id at 296-97.
92. Id But see supra note 85.
93. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
94. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 302 (Blackmun & O'Connor, 11.,
. concurring).
95. Id
96. Id at 298.
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late draft committees. 97
Thus, in defining a political committee for purposes of the
FECA, the Supreme Court has created a distinction between those
committees advocating particular issues and those supporting an
nounced candidates. Draft committees, however, fall somewhere in
between these two types of committees. A draft committee does
more than advocate or support a particular issue, yet draft commit
tees, by definition, do not support individuals who have officially an
nounced their candidacy. Instead, draft committees seek to
encourage an individual who is not yet an officially announced can
didate for political office to become one. Once that individual does
announce his candidacy, the draft committee ceases its activities. 98
5. Federal Election Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan
Political League

The first step in determining whether draft groups are political
committees for purposes of the Act was taken by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Federal Election
Commission v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League .99 The Ma
chinists Non-Partisan Political League case evolved from the same
Carter-Mondale complaint which initiated the FEC litigation
against the Committee. loo Specifically, FEC believed that Machinists
Non-Partisan Political League [MNPL] may have exceeded the con
tribution limitations of the Act by its financial support of the alleg
edly affiliated draft-Kennedy committees. 101 MNPL claimed,
however, that none of the draft-Kennedy groups to which it contrib
uted money, including the Committee, were political committees as
defined by the Act, and thus, the FEC lacked subject matter jurisdic
tion necessary to conduct the investigation. 102 The issue, therefore,
was whether draft committees, such as the Committee, were political
committees under the FECA.
Before reaching a decision on the FEC's jurisdiction over draft
groups, the Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court deter
97. The Florida for Kennedy Comm. court found that draft committees were not
subject to either the contribution limitations nor the disclosure provisions of the Act.
The 1979 amendments, however, have since required draft committees to report to the
FEC, although they are still not bound by the contribution limitations. See infra note
III and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
99. 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerro denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
100. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
101. 655 F.2d at 383.
102. Id at 390.
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mined that the district court had erred in enforcing the FEC sub
poena against MNPL. 103 The court then held that draft committees
were not subject to the Act's provisions. I04
Citing Buckley, the Machinists Non-Partisan Political League
court held that the Act only encompassed those "organizations that
{were} under the control ofa candidate or the major purpose of which
{was} the nomination or election of a candidate."lOs Because draft
committees do not support a "candidate", they are o~tside of the
Act's restrictions. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League
court refused to extend the Buckley definition to include draft com
mittees. They noted that the only justification in Buckley for up
holding the Act's contribution limitations, given the fundamental
first amendment activities involved, was the elimination of the actual
or apparent corruption that exists between large contributors and
candidates. 106 Furthermore, Buckley requires that the "actuality and
potential for corruption" be identifiable. 107 The Machinists Non-Par
tisan Political League court, however, concluded that this type of po
tential or actual corruption is not identifiable with draft groups
because draft groups may exist for the purpose of encouraging a
whole field of candidates rather than just a single individual. I08
Although relying primarily on Buckley, the Machinists Non-Par
tisan Political League court also noted that a reading of the statutory
language and legislative history of the FECA,I09 the FEe's treat
103.
104.
105.

Id
Id at 396.
Id at 391 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 79 (1976» (emphasis in

original).
106. Id at 392.
107. Id
108. Id
109. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court conceded that the lack of
any specific mention of draft committees prior to 1979 was not surprising because such
groups, until recently, were a relatively unknown phenomenon in the federal campaign
process. 655 F.2d at 394. Congressional silence with regard to these groups, however,
does not necessarily indicate a Congressional intent to exclude them from the statutory
restrictions. This is especially true where the overall purpose and intention of Congress
in enacting the FECA and the plain language of the Act's provisions are circumvented by
such a technical omission. For instance, in Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945), the
Court upheld a labor department restriction disallowing the use of "industrial home
work" to circumvent the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
even though the statute made no reference to "industrial homework." 324 U.S. at 263.
The Court gave no weight to the statutory omission because the statute's purpose and
language were designed to prevent such circumvention of the mandated guidelines. Id
at 259-63. The omission of draft committees from the FECA's provisions provides an
analogous situation which dictates an analogous result under F70rida for Kennedy
Comm., 681 F.2d at 1292 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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ment of draft committees,IlO and the 1979 amendments to the
FECA, III supported their conclusion that draft committees were not
110. The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court also noted that the FEC
did not consider draft committees to be political committees and, therefore, they were not
subject to the Act's provisions. 655 F.2d at 395. The court cited the FEC's 1975-1979
annual reports which have consistently recommended to Congress that draft committees
should be subject to the Act's contribution limitations and reporting provisions. Id The
annual reports reveal that the FEC has always considered draft committees to be polit
ical committees and subject to the contribution limitations. See, e.g., 1975 FED. ELEC
TION COMM'N ANN. REP. 79. The FEC was concerned that the contribution limits which
apply to draft committees should be the same as those applying to committees supporting
a candidate. As noted earlier, draft committees were allowed higher contribution limita
tions than candidate committees. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. These
recommendations do not demonstrate that the commission believed draft committees fell
outside of the Act's restrictions, but rather they indicate the opposite result: that draft
groups were always considered by the FEC to be subject to the Act's provisions.
Although the FEC has always considered draft committees to be subject to the dis
closure provisions of the Act, early in its existence, it did ask Congress to affirm that
proposition. 1976 FED. ELECTION COMM'N ANN. REP. at 75-6. Because Congress re
mained silent until the 1979 amendments, the FEC has always felt that draft committees
were subject to the disclosure requirements. This fact is evidenced by an FEC advisory
opinion submitted to the National Committee for a Democratic Alternative: a draft
Kennedy group. The opinion stated that:
A group soliciting funds and making expenditures which are expected to
be in excess of $1,000 for 1979, as would appear to be the case of the Commit
tee, would qualify as a political committee for purposes of the Act and is subject
to all registration and reporting requirements as well as all other provisions of
the Act.
1979-41 FEC Advisory Opinion 3 (1979), summarized in, 1979 FED. ELECTION COMM'N
ANN. REp. 8.
Ill. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d at 394-95. The 1979
amendments were generally designed to be "non-controversial." H. ALEXANDER, supra
note 29, at 37. The basic purposes were: to simplify the Act's recording and record
keeping provisions; increase the role of state and local political parties; reduce the proce
dural requirements of the enforcement process; and, provide increased opportunity for
respondents to present their defenses. Id In the 1979 amendments, however, Congress
did adopt the FEC's recommendation that draft committees be subject to the Act's dis
closure provisions. H.R. REp. No. 96-422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2860.
The Machinists Non-Partisan Political League court noted that this addition demon
strated that Congress did not consider draft committees subject to the Act's provisions
and now desired them to be only subject to the disclosure provisions. 655 F.2d at 394-96.
The legislative history of the 1979 amendments, however, indicates that Congress consid
ered draft committees to be subject to the Act's jurisdiction prior to 1979. Brief for Ap
pellee at 16, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281
(11th Cir. 1982). The change was made simply to insure that draft committees report. It
does not indicate that they were considered exempt from all of the Act's provisions.
In addition, Congress' failure to specifically require draft committees to be subject to
certain contribution limits, does not automatically demonstrate that Congress did not
consider and did not want draft groups subject to the contribution limits. Rather, this
omission can be read as a demonstration of agreement concerning FEC's present han
dling of the matter. For instance, Congress may feel that draft groups should have
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political committees. Because draft committees were not subject to
the Act's provisions, the FEC could not investigate the activities of
MNPL regarding the draft-Kennedy groups.
IV.
A.

The Presence
Commitiees

ANALYSIS

of Quid Pro Quo Corruption and Draft

In Floridalor Kennedy Committee, the eleventh circuit held that
draft committees were not subject to the FECA's restrictions because
draft committees did not support a clearly identified candidate. I 12 In
reaching this conclusion, the Florida lor Kennedy Committee court
based its conclusion upon the definition of a political committee
enunciated in Buckley and adopted by the Machinists Non-Partisan
Political League court. 1 13
As previously noted, an important aspect of the Buckley deci
sion concerned the presence of, or even the appearance of, qUidpro
quo corruption in the political process. It is only when this corrup
tion is present that limitations on political activity can be justified,
despite the infringement upon first amendment rights which result
from such restrictions. I 14 The absence of such corruption with issues
and referenda groups led the Court to narrowly define political com
mittee so as to exclude these groups from the FECA's restrictions. 1 15
Draft committees, such as FKC, however, should not be excluded
from the FECA's restrictions because they do, in fact, present the
same potential for corruption as candidate committees. The conclu
sion by Machinists Non-Partisan Political League that the "actuality
and potential for corruption" is not "identifiable" with draft commit
tees because draft groups may exist for the purpose of encouraging a
whole field of candidates rather than a single individual, 116 over
looks the facts of the two cases. Both MNPL and the Committee
were concerned with nomination of a single individual, and as such,
higher limitations than those supporting a candidate due to the importance of early
money and exposure to a campaign, particularly when there still exists some doubt as to
whether the individual will actually run or not. If Congress felt that the current direction
of the FEC in this area was incorrect or that additional clarification was necessary, it
could have specifically changed the provisions involved. Absent such a change, the
FEC's treatment of draft committees should remain intact.
112. 681 F.2d at 1288.
113. Id at 1287.
114. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
116. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d at 392.
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the potential for quidpro quo corruption between Senator Kennedy
and these groups did exist.
The significant connection between the Committee and Senator
Kennedy can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. \17 The two most
obvious connections are the committee's name and its stated purpose
of causing Senator Kennedy to accept the Democratic Nomination
to the office of the President. lls Further evidence of an identifiable
connection involves an FEC advisory opinion. 119 In this opinion,
several officers and personnel of the Virginia Democrats for Leader
ship and Commitment, a draft-Kennedy committee, asked if they
could communicate and cooperate with the Kennedy Presidential
Campaign without causing the draft committee to be related to the
Kennedy campaign committee for purposes of the Act's require
ments.120 The FEC ruled that as long as the draft committee had
become inactive (Kennedy having declared his candidacy) and the
individuals would not be simultaneously working for both groups,
the individuals could indeed participate in the Kennedy campaign
without connecting the draft group to any of the restrictions for can
didate committees. l2l Similarly, individuals who contributed to
draft-Kennedy groups were also likely to be the same individuals
contributing to his campaign. 122 Thus, the Committee and the other
117. The issue of how clearly an independent group is connected with a candidate
or potential candidate has also been discussed in relation to independent expenditures.
For example, on September 26, 1980 Common Cause filed a complaint with the FEC
alleging that a certain group supporting Ronald Reagan was not really independent of
his campaign committee. In the complaint, Common Cause submitted the following fac
tors to be used in determining when a group's expenditures are really separate from, and
uncoordianted with, an individual's campaign:
-membership of committees and steering bodies;
-conscious parallelism of activities;
-indirect communications;
-interlocking consultants, vendors, and suppliers;
-coordinated events;
-use of candidate's name; and
-use of material provided by a candidate.
Wertheimer & Huwa, Campaign Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future Chal
lenges, 10 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 43,64 n.198 (1980-81). See also Note, Mak
ing Campaign Finance Law Enforceable: Closing the Independent Expenditure Loophole,
15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 363 (1982). See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
118. Brief of Appellant at 2, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
119. 1979-65 FEC Advisory Opinion, 1-3 (1979), summarized in, 1979 FEC ANN.
REp. 9.
120. 1979-65 FEC Advisory Opinion (1979), summarized in, 1979 FED. ELECTION
COMM'N ANN. REp. 83.
121. Id.
122. 1980-81 FEC Advisory Opinion, 1-3 (1980), summarized in, 1980 FED. ELEC
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draft-Kennedy groups would seem to be clearly identified with Sena
tor Kennedy regardless of the technical status, of his candidacy.
The group's close identity with Senator Kennedy and his subse
quent campaign organization seems to indicate the potential for the
very same type of qUidpro quo corruption that concerned the Buck
ley Court.123 The fact that an individual has not yet officially de
clared his candidacy does not significantly diminish the potential of
a large contributor being rewarded for his efforts. The only differ
ence is that the contribution is a little riskier because the possibility
exists that the candidate may ultimately choose not to run.
An office seeker would be extremely indebted to a person who
contributed to a draft committee, especially when, under the Florida
for Kennedy Committee opinion, an unlimited amount could be con
tributed. For if the office seeker does announce his candidacy, the
contributor has provided an opportunity for the candidate to receive
valuable early exposure. Such initial exposure can be particularly
important given the present Presidential primary system in which
success in an early primary may be instrumental in assisting the can
didate in raising the necessary funds for later primaries. 124 As the
FEC has stated, "the very essence of a draft committee is to influence
the nomination of a person to federal office. It stretches credibility
to argue, as [the Committee] does, that attempting to influence some
one to become a candidate is not an attempt to influence that per
son's nomination for election."125 A similar conclusion was reached
by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, which
stated:
[This] court could not, merely on the basis of the [the Commit
tee's] assertions, definitively hold that Senator Kennedy was never
a "candidate" until his public announcement. Nor could it hold
that the activities of the various draft committees were efforts
solely to convince the Senator to run, rather than help elect him.
These issues would require a factual investigation very much
nON COMM'N ANN. REP. 101 (determining whether a certain individual's contributions
made to a draft committee count against his $25,000 aggregate limit in 1979 or his 1980
limit, both contributions going to pro-Kennedy groups). See a/so, Ifshin & Warin, supra
note 6 at 509 n.167 (Kennedy fundraising efforts were impaired because many contribu
tors were unsure whether contributions to draft committees counted as contributions to
Kennedy's campaign committee).
123. 681 F.2d at 1293 (Clark, J., dissenting). See supra notes 72-76 and accompa
nying text.
124. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 20.
125. Brief for Appellee at 14, Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (lIth Cir. 1982).
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along the lines which the Commission [FEC] proposes to
follow. 126

Thus, the Florida for Kennedy Committee opinion provides a
mechanism for the type of unlimited contributions that the FECA
sought to avoid. 127 This fact is particularly disturbing because the
contribution limitations of the Act have succeeded in reducing the
influence of "big-givers."128 By contributing unlimited amounts to
draft committees, these individuals can once again yield substantial
influence in political campaigns.
B.

Draft Committees and the First Amendment Right of
Association

A discussion of the First Amendment right of association also
clarifies the difference between draft committees and issue or refer
enda groups. The Florida for Kennedy Committee court expressed
the belief that serious constitutional questions would arise if draft
groups such as the Committee were subject to the Act's require
ments.129 This concern, also expressed in the Buckley decision,I3O is
not present with the draft-Kennedy groups. These groups do not
involve the potential chilling effect that is present in issue or candi
date groups that support candidates or political views outside those
126. Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587,
595 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
127. This rational is furthered demonstrated by a 1979 FEC advisory opinion. The
opinion allows an individual to form his own committee to "test the waters" regarding
his chances for success, and allows the committee to be exempt from the Act's restrictions
on political committees. The ruling, however, points out that if the individual does offi
cially declare his candidacy, contributions given to his earlier committee must be subse
quently disclosed and will count against the contribution limitations of his supporters.
This eliminates any chance of a person contributing over the Act's limits. 1979-26 FEC
Advisory Opinion 1-3 (l979), summarized in, 1978 FED. ELECTION COMM. ANN. REP. 75.
128. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 64.
129. Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281,
1287-88 (1982). The majority cites the case of EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theologi
cal Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir. 1981), for the proposition that ambiguous stat
utes which present a significant risk that a first amendment right will be infringed, must
be construed narrowly, in such a manner so as to avoid such potential constitutional
problems. Id at 1287. Based on this interpretation they conclude that the FECA should
be read as excluding the Committee and other draft committees to avoid creating any
constitutional problems. Id at 1287-88. This determination misses the mark for two
reasons. First, the statute is not ambiguous, see infra notes 138-144 and accompanying
text. Second, enforcement of the statute poses no threat to the committee's constitutional
rights. 681 F.2d· at 1291 (Clark, J., dissenting); see infra notes 130-33 and accompanying
text.
130. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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of the mainstream of American politics. As the Floridafor Kennedy
Committee dissent explains:
The appellant [the Committee] has not raised even a colora
ble associational freedom claim. It was supporting the candidacy
of an individual who narrowly lost the presidential nomination of
one of the two major parties. No stigma could be attached to such
efforts. Fear of a "chilling effect" upon such committees is simply
so wild as to be baseless. The appellant has brought forth no facts
or reasons which demonstrate how a "chilling effect" would come
about. Thus, the threshold requirements of an associational rights
claim have not been met in the instant case, as no reasonable like
lihood that political association will be discouraged has been
established. 131

Even if Florida for Kennedy Committee were able to demonstrate a
colorable associational claim, such infringement must be balanced
against the compelling governmental interest of preventing
corruption. 132
These two factors, the potential for corruption and relatively
minor infringements on associational rights, tend to severely weaken
the FlOridafor Kennedy Committee court's claim that the Act must be
read as excluding draft committees in order to avoid constitutional
problems. The problems feared simply do not exist in the present
situation. 133
Thus, given the concerns of the Buckley Court, in excluding is
sue groups from the Act and including those supporting a candidate,
draft committees should be accorded the same treatment as the latter
groups. Buckley was concerned only with excluding issue groups
whose first amendment rights of political expression would be vio
lated if subject to the Act's provisions or fringe-political groups
whose first amendment right to association might also be infringed.
The Buckley Court did not intend to omit all groups that did not
support an officially announced candidate from the Act's restric
tions. 134 The mere fact that a group is not sponsoring a candidate, in
the technical sense, does not mean that the purposes that caused the
131. 681 F.2d at 1294 (Clark, J., dissenting).
132. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
133. 681 F.2d at 1294-95 (Clark, J., dissenting).
134. The Buckley court in dicta implied that not all political committees would
require the presence of a candidate to be subject to the Act's provisions. In a footnote,
they stated that "[s]ome partisan committees-groups within the control of a candidate
or [those]primanry organized/or political activities" ... will be subject to the disclosure
provisions of the Act. 424 U.S. at 80 n.107 (emphasis supplied). Because the Committee
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Court to narrowly define political committee, exist in draft commit
tees. 135 Adhering to such a restrictive interpretation would not only
fail to satisfy the concerns of Buckley, the elimintation of quid pro
quo corruption,136 but also would defeat much of Congress' inten
.
tion in implementing the FECA. 137
C. Statutory J)efinition and Legislative History of UPolitical
Committee"
Since the Buckley decision did not warrant the conclusion
reached by the Floridafor Kennedy Committee court, what that court
termed "FEC's technical argument," utilizing the plain language of
the statute, becomes increasingly important. The Act defines a polit
ical committee as a committee which receives contributions or makes
expenditures in excess of $1,000 per year.I 38 The key elements in
defining a political committee are expenditures l39 and contribu
tions. l40 Both are defined in terms of making payments "for the pur

is primarily organized for the purpose of electing an individual to political office, it
would seem to represent the type of "other partisan committee" discussed by the court.
Also, in accepting the restrictive interpretation of the earlier lower courts, Buckley
used the words "nonpartisan organizations" in describing political committees which
were outside the Act's provisions, as opposed to excluding committees which did not
support a "clearly identified candidate." 424 U.S. at 79 n.I06. This could imply that the
court did not want to define political committees as only those groups supporting a can
didate. Additional support for a broader definition of political committee by the Court
can be inferred from their statement that "dollars given to another person or organiza
tion that are earmarked for political purposes are contributions under the Act." Id at 24
n.24. Under this definition, the Committee would seem to qualify as a political commit
tee.
Furthermore, an argument can be made that the Buckley court in defining political
committee, did not use the word candidate in the technical FECA sense, but rather it was
to be given its broader every day meaning. 681 F.2d at 1292 (Clark, J., dissenting). The
Floridafor Kennedy Comm. dissenting opinion reaches this conclusion through two ob
servations. First, the Buckley court consistently used words such as "clearly identified"
and "particularly Federal" to modify the word candidate. If the technical definition of
candidate was intended, the use of these additional words would have been unnecessary.
Secondly, the Court placed words likepolitical committee, expenditure and contribution in
quotes when referring to their technical FECA definition. The word candidate never
appeared in quotes. Id at 1292-93 (Clark, J., dissenting). This broader reading of the
term candidate would cause draft committees to be covered by the Act, because the Buck
ley Court only intended to trim the vague fringe areas of the statute which would involve
constitutional violations while still maintaining what it considered the core of the Act.
Id at 1293 (Clark, J., dissenting).
135. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
139. 2 U.S.C. § 43 I (9)(A) (1982).
140. Id § 43 I (8)(A) (1982).
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pose of influencing the election [of any person] for Federal office." 141
The use of "person" rather than "candidate" represents a conscious
choice by Congress to give the FEC authority over all types of
groups whose purpose is to influence federal elections. 142
The legislative history of the term political committee and gen
eral canons of statutory construction support this broad interpreta
tion. The House of Representatives defined a political committee as
"any committee, association or organization which accepts contribu
tions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or at
tempting to influence the election of one or more candidates for
Federal elective office."143 The bill, as passed however, did not con
tain the word candidate. 144 Congress, thus, impliedly rejected a leg
islative proposal that would have limited political committees solely
to those supporting a candidate.
In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that "the
starting point in every case of statutory interpretation is 'the actual
language employed by Congress.' "145 This general principle of stat
utory construction was recently employed by the Supreme Court in
another election law case, Bread Political Action Committee v.
FECI46 In Bread Political Action Committee, the Court noted that
absent a "clearly expressed legislative intention" to the contrary, the
plain language of the statute was controlling. 147 In the present case,
not only is there no legislative history to the contrary, but the legisla
tive history actually supports inclusion of draft committees into the
Act.

Therefore, both a review of the relevant legislative history and
141. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A), (9)(A) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
142. 681 F.2d at 1290-91 (Clark, J., dissenting).
143. H.R. Doc. No. 11060, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1971). The definitions of
contribution and expenditure were slightly revised by the 1980 amendments. The most
recent definitions eliminate the phrase "of any person" and replace it with "for the pur
pose ofinfiuencing any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 43 I (8)(A), (9)(A) (1982).
Although these changes do not alter the main thrust of the Act, they do demonstrate
Congress' intent to regulate those contributions and expenditures designed to impact on
federal elections. Floridafor Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d at 1289 (Clark, J., dissenting).
144. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
145. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit at 6 n.6, Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Parti
san Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing CBS, Inc. v. Federal Commu
nications Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367,385 (1981), quoting Reiter v. Sonotone, 422 U.S. 330,
337 (1979».
146. 455 U.S. 577 (1982).
147. Id at 581.
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general canons of statutory construction support the view that Con
gress intended draft committees to be subject to the Act's restrictions.

v.

EFFECT AND IMPACT OF THE

FKC DECISION

Under the 1979 Amendments to the FECA, draft committees
are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements. Floridafor Kennedy
Committee and Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, however,
indicate that because draft committees are not political committees,
such groups are not subject to the Act's contribution limitations. 148
The Supreme Court's refusal of the Machinists Non-Partisan League
petition, along with the lack of further Congressional action,149 indi
cates that the present situation will remain. For these reasons, an
analysis of the effect of the exclusion of draft committees from many
of the Act's requirements is appropriate.
While draft committees are a relatively new phenomenon used
extensively in only Presidential elections, there is reason to believe
that their presence in all elections will increase. Furthermore, the
adoption of the Presidential primary system with its public funding
and expenditure limitations has increased the number of potential
candidates actively seeking their party's nominations. ISO Utilization
of draft committees has increased accordingly. Because draft com
mittees are not under FEC jurisdiction, many of the problems and
issues regarding draft committees will remain unanswered,lsl thus
providing a vehicle for circumvention of many of the Act's require
ments. There is a potential for qUid pro quo corruption between
draft groups and the individual. ls2 The FEC's petition of the Ma
chinists Non-Partisan Political League decision, however, briefly
highlights the potential scenario:
Draft committees, not subject to FECA's contribution limitations,
will have the potential of funnelling large aggregations of money,
including corporate and union treasury funds, into federal cam
paigns. Such committees, able to accept unlimited funds, will be
in direct competition with those committees supporting candi
148. Machinists Non-Partisan Political Comm., 655 F.2d at 396 (the court admitted
that the post 1979 treatment of draft groups is unclear).
149. Three bills were introduced during the 97th Congress which would subject
draft committees to the contribution limits of the Act: S. 1851, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981), S. 1899, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) and H.R. 6479, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
Extensive hearings were held on S. 1851 which discussed the Act's applicability to draft
committees. The hearings, however, have not resulted in subsequent legislation.
ISO. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 135.
lSI. Ifshin & Warin, supra note 6, at 513.
152. See supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
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dates. A .proliferation of draft committees will severely damage
. the statutory scheme enacted by Congress and may completely
circumvent the provisions of FECA. Such a result was certainly
not the intent of Congress when it enacted FECA, and the appel
late court's judgments facilitating this result must be reversed. 15)

Certainly, potential office seekers are not hesitant to take advan
tage of such a situation. For instance, during the 1972 Presidential
campaign, Richard Nixon received a substantial percentage of his
contributions, particularly from business and wealthy individuals,
before the disclosure provisions of the 1971 Act became effective.
Although the disclosure and reporting requirements of the 1979
Amendments may prevent some individuals from contributing large
amounts,IS4 the Buckley Court noted that disclosure alone was insuf
ficient to preserve the integrity of the system. 155 The necessity of
contribution limitations to preserve the FECA's statutory scheme is
evidenced by the Machinists Non-Partisn Political League decision
which allows business and labor political action committees (com
monly referred to as Pacs) to contribute unlimited amounts to draft
committees. It should be remembered that the potential influence of
such large aggregations of capital first prompted government regula
tion of federal campaigns back in the early 1900's.
Furthermore, the extensive role of Pacs, even in areas where
they are regulated, has been criticized by numerous commenta
tors. IS6 Much of this criticism has centered around two factors. The
first criticism is that while contribution limitations have minimized
the influence of the "big-givers", the money has simply shifted to
Pacs where the contribution limitations are slightly higher and the
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit at 5-6, Federal Election Comm'n v. Machinists Non-Parti
san Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.c. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
154. In addition to eliminating the potential for quidpro quo corruption, contribu
tion limitations also support the "one-man, one-vote" principle: each individual should
be able to influence federal elections only to the extent of the next, just as each individ
ual's vote should count equally. Large unlimited contributions, however, enable some
individuals to exhibit a disproportionate amount of infiuence. D. ADAMANY & G.
AGREE, supra note 44, at 185. See also Wright, Money and the Pollution ofPolitics: Is the
First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982).
ISS. California Medical Association v. Federal Election Comm'n, 641 F.2d 619
(9th Cir. 1981) (en bane), affd, 453 U.S. 182, 199-200 n.20 (1981) (citing Buckley v.
Yaleo, 424 U.S. I, 27-28 (1976».
156. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 146-47; Wright, supra note 154, at 614-20.
See generally, Adamany, PACS and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 ARIZ. L.
REv. 569 (1980).
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groups more capable of spending the money effectively. 157 A second
criticism of the Pac phenomenon involves the connection between a
Pac's contributions and expenditures and the subsequent votes of
Congressmen who were the beneficiaries of these efforts~xactly the
type of corruption feared in Buckley. 158
Pacs, however, have been only a minor participant in Presiden
tial elections. 159 This is probably due to the presence of public fund
ing in Presidential elections. Because funds are provided for both
general elections and primaries, Pac money is not as essential to a
Presidential office seeker as it is to congressional and senatorial can
didates, who have no public funding available and no expenditure
limitS.I60 The Florida for Kennedy Committee ruling, however, cre
ates a situation by which Pacs can have a substantial impact upon
Presidential campaigns. They can contribute millions of dollars to
those draft committees supporting individuals whose policies they
favor and nothing to those they oppose. The influx of such poten
tially large funds will provide important seed money and early expo
sure to certain office seekers, creating a potentially crippling
disadvantage for those who do not favor Pac concems. 161
The Florida for Kennedy Committee decision thus provides a
complete mechanism by which FECA requirements can be legally
circumvented. At a time when the average contribution to a Presi
dential candidate is $27.50, the doors are now open for contributions
resembling the 2 million dollars given by W. Clement Stone to Rich
ard Nixon in 1972. 162 The only condition to such a gift is that it take
place before an mdividual officially declares his candidacy. Unlim
ited contributions to draft committees also provide for an increase in
157. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 66. See also Cox, Constitutional Issues in the
Regulation ofthe Financing ofElection Campaigns, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395, 399 (1982).
158. Running with the PAC's, TIME MAG., Oct. 25, 1982 at 20. While many Pacs
may be considered issue groups and thus, protected by the Buckley, National Commillee
for Impeachment and Jennings rationales, others support specific individuals. Excluding
these latter types, such as the Committee, from the Act's provisions enables them to
spend substantial sums of money simply because the individuals they support are not
announced candidates. If draft committees were considered political committees under
the Act, the amount which these groups could contribute would be limited, and thus,
their impact lessened.
159. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29 at 86.
160. Id at 147.
161. The assumption that individuals not supported by corporate Pacs will receive
funds from labor Pacs is not always valid for both groups often support the same individ
ual, thus placing their opponent at a substantial financial disadvantage. Adamany, supra
note 154 at 591.
162. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 29 at 96.

1983)

DRAFT COMMITTEES

585

corporate and labor influence in the election process-the type of
situation the Act was designed to eliminate.
Even while subjected to a $5,000 contribution limitation, Florida
for Kennedy Committee still amassed a total of $267,018 163 and it
represented only one of nine draft-Kennedy groups. Without such
limits, one can only speculate on the potential accumulation of such
groups. The creation of such a situation surely does not represent
the intentions of Congress in enacting the FECA, yet it is precisely
the scenario that the Florida for Kennedy Committee decision has
created.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Efforts to regulate the influence of affluent interests in federal
elections have not always been successful. The complete elimination
of corruption in federal elections can probably never be achieved, at
least not without destroying the fundamental values of political ex
pression and association guaranteed by the first amendment. Yet
Congress, in enacting the FECA, has succeeded in at least closing
some of the loopholes that existed in earlier efforts to regulate fed
eral elections. The Florida for Kennedy Committee decision, how
ever, provided a new loophole through which the intentions and
purposes of Congress' efforts can be completely circumvented.
Excluding draft committees from the Act's provisions cannot be
justified by a reading of the appropriate statutory provisions in
volved. Nor does the opinion in Buckley mandate the decision by
the eleventh circuit in Floridafor Kennedy Committee. To avoid cir
cumvention of the FECA, that decision should be re-examined.
Kenneth R. Plumb

163. Brieffor Appellee at 2 n.l., Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy
Comm., 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982).

